When Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed the Global Development Initiative (GDI) at the General Debate of the 76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in September 2021, it was presented as a response to a simple but fundamental problem: Development had been pushed down the international agenda precisely at a time when developing countries needed it most.
(The GDI aims to pool efforts to tackle challenges, promote post-COVID-19 recovery and seize opportunities so as to open up a bright future for achieving common sustainable development and building a global development community—Ed.)
Five years later, the GDI has developed into a network of institutions, financing mechanisms, project platforms and international partnerships linking China with more than 100 countries and international organizations. Its significance lies not only in the number of projects, but in the attempt to place development cooperation within a more structured and operational framework.
Complementary paths
The institutional expansion has been substantial. The Group of Friends of the GDI, established at the UN headquarters in New York City, the United States, in 2022, today comprises more than 80 countries. This does not mean that all participants have adopted identical positions or committed comparable resources. It does, however, demonstrate that the GDI has acquired a considerable international constituency.
The financial dimension is equally important. China upgraded its South-South Cooperation Assistance Fund into the Global Development and South-South Cooperation Fund and doubled its funding to $4 billion. Chinese financial institutions also announced a dedicated $10-billion financing mechanism for GDI implementation. By 2025, the broader development project pool had expanded to more than 1,800 projects, while the $4-billion fund had supported more than 180 projects in over 60 countries through cooperation with more than 20 international organizations, benefiting more than 30 million people.
This highlights an important distinction between the GDI and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Launched in 2013, the China-proposed BRI aims to address one of the most glaring development challenges: inadequate infrastructure and transport connectivity. The GDI addresses a different set of issues affecting human potential and productive capacity.
It is therefore more appropriate to see the two initiatives as complementary rather than competing projects. A railway, port or energy corridor creates physical capacity; agricultural technology, healthcare, digital services and vocational training determine how effectively societies can use that capacity.
Central Asia illustrates this relationship particularly clearly. The region's economic geography has historically been shaped by continental isolation. The BRI responded directly by connecting Central Asian economies more closely with China, Russia, the Caucasus, South Asia and European markets.
New railways, roads, logistics facilities and border infrastructure have strengthened the region's potential as a Eurasian transit zone. At the same time, the Middle Corridor has gained importance as one of several routes linking China and Europe. The GDI adds another layer: Connectivity is not an end in itself but a means of raising productivity, improving public services and strengthening human capital.
Pragmatic cooperation
The GDI's evolution also reflects a broader transformation in China's international role. China is no longer participating only in institutions designed elsewhere. It is increasingly proposing institutions, funds and cooperation mechanisms of its own. The Global Development Promotion Center, the Global Development Knowledge Network, the project pool and the Global Development and South-South Cooperation Fund form part of this institutional ecosystem. The approach is also increasingly connected with UN agencies.
Earlier this year, for example, the UN Development Programme reported that the GDI project pool contained over 1,800 projects and emphasized cooperation with China on poverty reduction, renewable energy, digital innovation and infrastructure.
Relations between China and the U.S. add another dimension to the situation. Washington and Beijing remain rivals in trade, technology and security. Nevertheless, the Washington meetings between Xi and U.S. President Donald Trump in late September produced agreements on trade, AI and crisis communication. This modest success reflects a desire to stabilize bilateral relations, despite deep-seated strategic differences.
For countries of the Global South, greater stability in relations between the world's two largest economies matters greatly, as it reduces the need to view every Chinese or American development project solely through the prism of geopolitical rivalry.
This creates room for a more pragmatic division of effort. American institutions such as the Development Finance Corporation have considerable experience mobilizing private capital, while Chinese institutions have extensive experience in infrastructure, industrial development, as well as state-supported project financing. Multilateral organizations can provide additional standards, monitoring and coordination. In areas such as climate adaptation, food security, public health and digital infrastructure, cooperation need not require political agreement on every other issue.
This is also where the GDI differs from the logic of geopolitical blocs. Its strongest argument is practical: Developing countries require financing, technology, infrastructure, health systems, food security and productive employment irrespective of which major power they align with.
The more the GDI is implemented through cooperation with UN agencies and other international institutions, the more its value can be assessed through measurable development outcomes rather than geopolitical narratives.
China's wider international role should therefore be understood through three interconnected dimensions: finance, production and diplomacy. Its financial institutions provide capital; its manufacturing system provides increasingly affordable technologies in areas such as solar power, electric vehicles and digital equipment; and its diplomatic approach emphasizes sovereignty, development and non-interference.
The deeper significance of the GDI is that China is attempting to institutionalize development cooperation rather than treating it as a series of isolated aid projects. The experience of the past five years suggests that the initiative is becoming part of a broader architecture connecting development finance, technology, infrastructure, human capital and multilateral institutions.
The test for the next five years will be harder. The GDI will have to demonstrate transparency, financial sustainability, measurable outcomes, environmental responsibility and genuine local ownership. It will also need to mobilize resources beyond China itself.
If it succeeds, its historical importance will not lie in replacing the existing development system, but in making that system more pluralistic, more responsive to developing countries, and better able to finance the enormous gap between development ambitions and available resources.
In that sense, the GDI is one of the clearest expressions of China's transition from participant in the global development system to an increasingly consequential architect of its future.
The author is former prime minister of Kyrgyzstan, a distinguished professor at the Belt and Road School at Beijing Normal University and author of Central Asia's Economic Rebirth in the Shadow of the New Great Game (2023).
